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Thinking, Fast and Historical: A History of Heuristics
Topic: Heuristics
by Robert, 2020 Cohort
In 1974, Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky proposed a theory for why we sometimes make dumb decisions in the face of uncertainty. They said that, oftentimes when we are faced with uncertainty, we use ‘mental shortcuts’ in order to arrive at the answer quicker. They called these shortcuts ‘heuristics’. In doing so, they inadvertently gave birth to the study of heuristics as a psychological sub-discipline. They also, in doing so, strongly associated heuristics with biases. Heuristics where seen as the phenomenon of our brain trying to apply ‘Type 1’ thinking (sometimes called ‘lizard-brain’ thinking) to ‘Type 2’ (sometimes called ‘slow’ or ‘complex’) problems.
Jump forward over a decade, and psychologist Gary Kline has a different theory. He noticed that experienced firemen actually used some of these ‘heuristics’ when they had to make decisions quickly. Not only did they use them, but the heuristics actually benefited them. Kline’s theory was that, in situations when you do not have enough time to weigh the pros and cons of the different decisions, you go with what you think you know. In other words, you use ‘heuristics’. When the firemen had to make decisions quickly, they recalled situations that they had previously experienced which were similar to the one they were currently facing. They then proceeded to do exactly what they did back then. This is a form of the heuristic known as the ‘recognition heuristic’.
And so emerged the two sides, team pro-heuristics, championed by Kline, and team anti-heuristics, championed by Kahneman. Whilst Kline points out the success of the recognition heuristic in firefighters, Kahneman points out the failure of it in prejudices and product-picking.
Enter Gerd Gigerenzer who, in the 1990’s, re framed the whole heuristic question. Instead of asking if *heuristics work, we should, he said, be asking *when *they work. In other words, instead of asking whether the ‘recognition heuristic’ is a ‘good’ heuristics or a ‘bad’ heuristic, we should ask ‘in what *situation is it a good heuristic or a bad heuristic?’. Over the course of his research he has compiled lists of heuristics and associated situations in which they may prove useful. When a heuristic is said to be useful in a situation, it is said to be ‘ecologically rational’. One example of where a heuristic is ecologically rational is in predicting heart attacks. In a hospital study, two methods for predicting heart attacks where surveyed. Method 1 involved using a complex logistic regression algorithm and inputting many different symptoms. Method 2 involved using a heuristic known as ‘take-the-best’, which required doctors to answer three simple questions. Overall, the heuristic method predicted heart attacks more accurately then the logistic regression method. Additionally, the doctors preferred using the heuristic method.
Gigerenzers research has indicated that heuristics are most often ecologically rational in situations of high complexity and uncertainty, where you cannot quantify probabilities. This is seen in areas such as medicine. As the world becomes increasingly complex and uncertain, heuristics may play an increasingly significant role in decision making.
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In 1974, Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky proposed a theory for why we sometimes make dumb decisions in the face of uncertainty. They said that, oftentimes when we are faced with uncertainty, we use ‘mental shortcuts’ in order to arrive at the answer quicker. They called these shortcuts ‘heuristics’. In doing so, they inadvertently gave birth to the study of heuristics as a psychological sub-discipline. They also, in doing so, strongly associated heuristics with biases. Heuristics where seen as the phenomenon of our brain trying to apply ‘Type 1’ thinking (sometimes called ‘lizard-brain’ thinking) to ‘Type 2’ (sometimes called ‘slow’ or ‘complex’) problems.
Jump forward over a decade, and psychologist Gary Kline has a different theory. He noticed that experienced firemen actually used some of these ‘heuristics’ when they had to make decisions quickly. Not only did they use them, but the heuristics actually benefited them. Kline’s theory was that, in situations when you do not have enough time to weigh the pros and cons of the different decisions, you go with what you think you know. In other words, you use ‘heuristics’. When the firemen had to make decisions quickly, they recalled situations that they had previously experienced which were similar to the one they were currently facing. They then proceeded to do exactly what they did back then. This is a form of the heuristic known as the ‘recognition heuristic’.
And so emerged the two sides, team pro-heuristics, championed by Kline, and team anti-heuristics, championed by Kahneman. Whilst Kline points out the success of the recognition heuristic in firefighters, Kahneman points out the failure of it in prejudices and product-picking.
Enter Gerd Gigerenzer who, in the 1990’s, re framed the whole heuristic question. Instead of asking if *heuristics work, we should, he said, be asking *when *they work. In other words, instead of asking whether the ‘recognition heuristic’ is a ‘good’ heuristics or a ‘bad’ heuristic, we should ask ‘in what *situation is it a good heuristic or a bad heuristic?’. Over the course of his research he has compiled lists of heuristics and associated situations in which they may prove useful. When a heuristic is said to be useful in a situation, it is said to be ‘ecologically rational’. One example of where a heuristic is ecologically rational is in predicting heart attacks. In a hospital study, two methods for predicting heart attacks where surveyed. Method 1 involved using a complex logistic regression algorithm and inputting many different symptoms. Method 2 involved using a heuristic known as ‘take-the-best’, which required doctors to answer three simple questions. Overall, the heuristic method predicted heart attacks more accurately then the logistic regression method. Additionally, the doctors preferred using the heuristic method.
Gigerenzers research has indicated that heuristics are most often ecologically rational in situations of high complexity and uncertainty, where you cannot quantify probabilities. This is seen in areas such as medicine. As the world becomes increasingly complex and uncertain, heuristics may play an increasingly significant role in decision making.